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I. INTRODUCTION

Marlanan hearings arise from the 1996 U.S. Supreme Court case,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.' in which the Court determined
that claim interpretation is a question of law for the district court judge,
rather than a question of fact for the jury, even though the interpretation of
patent claims may include the interpretation of some factual material.2 In
the holding, Justice Souter noted that because claim interpretation is a
matter of law for a court to decide, there is no violation of the Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury since the determination of infringement
is still in the hands of the jury.3 In discussing the implication of the holding
in Markman, Circuit Judge Plager of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit stated that "[a]t the trial stage of a patent infringement suit, this
means that the trial judge is obligated to determine the meaning of the
claims, and, if ajury is used for the infringement phase, to instruct the jury
accordingly." 4
In order to promote inventive thought, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) grants an inventor, who discovers a useful and
novel invention, a patent right.5 Article I, Section 8, of the U.S.
Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 6 These patent
rights are infringed when someone "without authorization makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor." 7 To determine if a patent is being

1. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
2. Id. at 387.
3. Id. at 376.
4. See concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Plager in Cybor Corp. v.FAS Technology. Inc.,

138 F.3d 1448, 1463, (Fed. Cir. 1998).

5. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. The copyright and patent rights are derived from this
section of the U.S. Constitution. Clearly, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution had the foresight
to provide an incentive for persons skilled in science and art to share their inventive and creative
thought so that all may benefit therefrom. Id
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). For patents having an issue date before June 8, 1995, the patent
term is seventeen years from the issue date. For patents filed after June 8, 1995, the patent term
is twenty years from the filing date. For patents filed before, but issued after June 8, 1995, the
term is the longer of seventeen years from the issue date or twenty years from the filing date. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
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infringed, a patent infringement analysis, which is a two step process, must
be conducted.'
First, the asserted claim must be interpreted by the court as a matter
of law to determine their meaning and scope. In the second step, the
trier of fact determines whether the claims as thus construed read on
the accused product. To establish literal infringement, every
limitation set forth in a claim must be found in an accused product,
exactly.9
The second step is a determination of whether the allegedly infringing
device falls within the boundary of protection granted to the patent
holder.'0 Simply put, for a patent owner to be successful in a patent
infringement suit, at least one claim of the patent must be infringed.
Interpretation of the claims sets forth the boundaries of protection
granted by the patent right. A jury cannot determine whether infringement
has occurred without proper instructions as to the boundaries of the patent
at issue, i.e., a determination of whether the allegedly infringing activity
falls within the boundaries of the protection granted by the patent right.
"Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim
covers the alleged infringer's product or process, which in turn necessitates
a determination of 'what the words in the claim mean.""' Accordingly, the
interpretation of the claims as read in view of the specification and in some
cases in view ofextrinsic evidence, (i.e., expert witness testimony, treatises,
reference manuals, etc. 2) is a key factor in patent litigation.
When should the claims be interpreted? Because the U.S. Supreme
Court in Marlkman left this question unanswered, this article will focus on
possible answers to this question that have lingered since the introduction
of Marlananhearings. Present research indicates that the courts have not
ruled as to when a Marlknan hearing should be held. Most U.S. District
8. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Cybor,
138 F.3d at 1454.

9. Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1575; see also Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454 (where the circuit court
held that "lain infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines the scope and
meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then the properly construed claims are compared to the
allegedly infringing device.") (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 371-73 and Read Corp. v. Protec,
Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821).
I0.Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454.
It. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374.
12. More detail regarding the use of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of claims
follows below. For still further details, see Karl Koster, Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim
Interpretation:UnderstandingPost-Markman Confusion, 8 J.INTELL. PROP. L. 113 (2000).
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Courts do not have a prescription for the timing of Markman hearings.
Therefore, in mostjurisdictions, a Markman hearing can be held at any time
during the patent litigation (e.g., anytime between the beginning of
discovery to just before jury instructions are given by the judge).
This Article will also explore some of the other issues that have been
raised since the introduction of Markman hearings. For example, whether
the use of extrinsic evidence is appropriate when interpreting patent claims,
and also the effects ofMarkman hearings on the Seventh Amendment right
to a trial by jury. Furthermore, this Article will analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of conducting Markman hearings at particular times during
litigation. This Article will analyze and discuss the Northern District of
California Patent Local Rules, which determine the timing of patent
infringement suits in that jurisdiction. Finally, this Article will discuss the
policy reasons and possible benefits to small individual inventors of holding
Markman hearings early in the litigation process. A shortened discovery
period that provides an early ruling on the interpretation of the claims, and
thereby provides early certainty in the patent litigation, is one example of
the benefits of an early Markman hearing.
II. MARKMAN v. WESTvIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC. - A BRIEF BACKGROUND
At the time of the patent infringement suit in Markman, Herbert
Markman owned a patent directed to "a system that tracks clothing through
a dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate
transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors."' 3
Westview's product "also uses a keyboard and processor and lists drycleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical
detectors."' 4 Thejury interpreted the claim language ofthe Markman patent
in such a manner that the Westview product fell within the boundaries of
the patent protection granted to Markman."5 Although the jury found that
Westview's product infringed Markman's patent, the district court judge
disagreed with the jury interpretation of the claim on the grounds that
Westview's product did not "track" inventory as the term was used in the
claim language of the Markman patent." Consequently,
the District Court
7
ordered a directed verdict in favor of Westview.1

13. Marlnan,517 U.S. at 370.
14. Id.

15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Recognizing that patent claim interpretation, and more specifically, the
determination of whose responsibility it, is to interpret the claims of a
patent, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that,
[t]he question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called
patent claim, the portion of the patent document that defines
the scope of the patentee's rights, is a matter of law reserved
entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment
guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any
disputed term of art about which expert testimony is offered.
We hold that the construction of a patent, including the terms
of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province ofthe
court. II

In concluding that Westview's product infringed Markman's patent, the
District Court found that the jury did not properly interpret the claim before

it and substituted its construction of the disputed claim term. 9 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the District Court, and held that the interpretation of the
claim language should be left in the hands of the district court judge.2°
The dispute in Markman hinged on the interpretation of the word
"inventory" as found in Independent Claim 1 of the Markman patent.2
Independent Claim 1 of the Markman patent noted "[t]he inventory control
and reporting system, comprising.., a data processor including memory
operable to record said information and means to maintain an inventory
total. .. ."'

Under the jury's interpretation of Independent Claim 1,

Westview' s product infringed the Markman patent." Under the trial court's
interpretation of the claims, however, "the production, sale, or use of a
tracking system for dry cleaners would not infringe Markman's patent
unless the product was capable of tracking articles of clothing throughout
the cleaning process and generating reports about their status and
location." 4 The District Court found that Westview's system did not
include a means to maintain the inventory total, and therefore, did not fall
within the boundary of the Markman patent. Markman demonstrated that

18. Marlknan, 517 U.S. at 372.
19. Id. at 376.
20.
21.
22.
cleaning
23.
24.
25.

Id
Id. at 375.
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,550,246- inventory control and reporting system for drystores. Marknan '246 was filed on Apr. 13, 1984 and issued on Oct. 29, 1985.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 375.
Id.
Id.
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although a jury has the final say as to whether the patent claim is infringed,
a district court judge must first interpret the claim to determine its true
limitation.26
There has been much difficulty with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding
in Marknan. Although some questions have been raised as to the
constitutionality of Marknan, such as the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial,' even more questions have been raised concerning the timing of
Markman hearings. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Markman set forth
the requirement that a proper patent infringement analysis must include a
claim interpretation hearing, and that claim interpretation is a question of
law for a court, not a question of fact for ajury.2" The ruling, however, did
not address any procedural aspects regarding the newly required claim
interpretation hearing, such as a particular time when the claim
interpretation hearing should be held. Since the U.S. Supreme Court
provided no guidelines as to the timing of the claim interpretation hearing,
district court judges are free to use their discretion as to when the hearings
should be held. This leads to inconsistency throughout the district courts as
to the timing ofaMarkman hearing, which not only varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, but may also vary from judge to judge within the same
jurisdiction. The inconsistency at the district court level leads to varying
procedures in patent litigation such as disparate amounts of time allowed
for discovery. Furthermore, in cases where the cost of litigation is high due
to lengthy discovery periods, there is less incentive for the parties to settle
the matter since they have already spent so much money during the
discovery stage.
III. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL -

WHO SHOULD INTERPRET CLAIMS
AND WHY? JUDGE OR JURY?

One of the issues confronted by the Markman Court was whether a
patent holder's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury is violated when
the patent's claims are interpreted by a district court judge rather than a
jury.29 Is the patent holder deprived of the right to a trial by jury when the
district court judge interprets the patent claim? The U.S. Supreme Court in

26. Id at 372.
27. For a detailed discussion as to the constitutionality of Markman hearings, see Joseph A.
Miron, Jr., The Constitutionalityof a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.KENT L. REv. 865 (1998).
28. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374.
29. Id. at 372.
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Markman answered this question in the negative. This section provides a
brief discussion on the policy behind allowing the district court judge to
interpret patent claims.
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to
a trial by jury.30 Consequently, the question arose in Markman as to
whether or not the act ofremoving the responsibility of claim interpretation
from the jury and making it a question of law for the district court judge
was a violation of Herbert Markman's Seventh Amendment right to a trial
by jury.3 '
The ongoing question of whether claim interpretation is a question of
fact for a jury or a question of law for a court was finally put to rest by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Markman.32 The U.S. Constitution provides that
[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.33
Clearly, the value in controversy in a patent infringement case will normally
exceed the twenty dollar requirement that our forefathers provided in the
U.S. Constitution and therefore, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial is applicable in patent infringement and patent validity suits.
In the case of United States v. Wonson,34 the circuit court stated that the
right to a trial by jury is a right which existed under the English common
law, "the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence., 3' The circuit court in
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.

31. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
32. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

34. 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (Mass. 1812).
35. The Wonson Court further noted that
[alt the time when the constitution was submitted to the people for adoption, one
of the most powerful objections urged against it was, that in civil causes it did
not secure the trial of facts by a jury. And that the appellate jurisdiction of the
supreme court, both as to law and fact, would enable that court, with or without
a new jury, to re-examine the whole facts, which had been settled by a previous
jury.
Id. See also dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S.

415, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2231 (1996) "[a]t common law, review of judgments was had only on writ
of error, limited to questions of law."
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Wonson discussed appellate jurisdiction in regard to questions of fact that
have been determined by a jury and noted that appellate level courts are
only to examine errors of law." More specifically, the Wonson Court stated
that "according to the rules of the common law the facts once tried by a
jury are never re-examined, unless a new trial is granted in the discretion of
the court, before which the suit is depending, for good cause shown.""
Accordingly, a pre-Marlknanclaim interpretation, i.e. claim interpreted by
the jury, would not be subject to appeal. As has sometimes been the case
in the past, there have been times when juries have misconstrued facts
(claim interpretation or otherwise). It is, of course, foreseeable that a jury
might struggle with the task of interpreting claims when complicated
technology is involved. Therefore, in the pre-Markinan days, claim
interpretations by juries were far more likely to be inconsistent from case
to case. For example, a jury may interpret a claim element one way, and
another jury, in a different case, may interpret the same claim element in a
much different way. This high degree of inconsistency, coupled with the
non-appealability of a pre-Marknan claim interpretation created a
dangerous situation for both a patent holder and a patent challenger- both
of whom are sure to have exerted a great deal of resources on the litigation
before even arriving at trial. This situation was remedied when the
Markman Court determined that claim interpretation is a matter of law for
a court, rather than a fact for a jury.38 According to the test set forth in
Wonson, the interpretation can be re-examined at the appellate level.39
Therefore, by making claim interpretation a question of law for a court, the
Mar/kman Court made claim interpretation re-examinable at the appellate
level.4'
As the U.S. Supreme Court in Mark nan noted, "there is no dispute that
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were
more than two centuries ago."' Clearly, a patent infringement case is a
matter that must be heard before ajury. One issue left for determination by
the Court in Mar/kman, however, was whether all portions of the trial, more
particularly claim interpretation, must also be heard before a jury. More
specifically, the Court in Mar/kman phrased the question as "whether a
particular issue occurring within a jury trial (here the construction of a
patent claim) is itself necessarily ajury issue, the guarantee being essential

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Woman, 28 F. Cas. at 749.
Id at 750.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 749.
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
1d at377.
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to preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ultimate dispute."' 2 The
true answer to this question resides in the analysis of whether Herbert
Markman's fundamental Seventh Amendment right was violated when the
particular issue of claim interpretation was not brought before the jury. It
is imperative to note that the Markman Court was not eliminating the right
to a trial by jury.43 The U.S. Supreme Court was only removing the issue
of claim interpretation from the jury's consideration." In a patent
infringement case, the question of whether or not there exists infringement
of the patent still resides with the jury.4
The Markman Court relied in part on the holding in the case of In re
Peterson46 to note that the requirement that claim interpretation be heard
by a court instead of ajury is not a violation of Herbert Markman's Seventh
Amendment right.47 The U.S. Supreme Court in Peterson held that "the
requirement of a preliminary hearing [does not] infringe the constitutional
right, either because it involves delay in reaching the jury trial, or because
it affords opportunity for exploring in advance the evidence which the
adversary purposes to introduce before the jury." ' Additionally, the
PetersonCourt noted that the requirement of a preliminary hearing before
an auditor was not an obstruction of the right to a jury trial.49
More recently, the question has arisen as to whether or not the holdings
in Markman should be applied to other intellectual property cases. For
example, in the case of SamaraBrothers,Inc. v. Wal-Mart,Inc.,° the issue

arose as to whether the circuit court or the jury should decide the
protectability of a claimant's trade dress.5" Wal-Mart relied on Markman
for the proposition that the question of whether trade dress is protected
should be left to a court, not a jury."2 The Samara Court, however,
summarily rejected this argument:

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 377.

45. Marknan, 517 U.S. at 377.
46. 253 U.S. 300 (1920). This case dealt with the sale and delivery of coal. The plaintiff
sued for a payment of approximately $21,000. In the defendant's answer, it was claimed that some
of the money had been paid. Hoping to simplify the issues for the jury, the trial judge granted the
defendant's motion, despite plaintiff's objection, and appointed an auditor to investigate the facts,
hear witnesses, examine accounts, and present them in court.
47. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Peterson, 253 U.S. at 310 (quoting Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I (1899)).
Id. at310.
165 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 1998).
Id at 123.

52. Id at 124.
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Without asking the Court to take the trade dress issue away from the
jury, Wal-Mart seeks application by this court of a lower level of
deference for the jury's verdict in light of the so-called "trend"
created by Marknan.We find no such "trend" reflected in the case
law nor do we find any law to support enforcement of a more
rigorous review of ajury verdict in a trade dress case.... There is
no language in Markman which would extend its holding to nonpatent cases. 3
The Samara Court reemphasized the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit by noting that only interpretation of the claims, not the
determination of whether there is actual infringement, is made a question
of law for a court.' In a trade dress infringement case, if the question of
protectability of the trade dress is made a question of law for a court, then
is there even a need for a jury? If a court determines that the trade dress is
not protectable, then it seems as though the inquiry of trade dress
infringement is over. If, however, a court determines that the trade dress is
protectable, then it will be up to a jury to determine whether or not the
protectable trade dress was infringed. In a patent infringement case,
*however, regardless of the outcome of the interpretation of the claims, a
genuine issue still remains for the jury to decide after the district court
judge interprets the claims.
In Samara, the Second Circuit noted that "[o]ur system relies on juries
to perform these tasks [the determination of protectability of trade dress]
even when the factual issues are challenging and subtle."" The question
that has arisen, therefore, is that if the Second Circuit recognizes the ability
of its jurors to determine complex issues, why then does the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit not recognize the ability of jurors to
determine the proper interpretation of claims in a patent infringement case?
The U.S. Supreme Court in Markman made it clear that the Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury is not violated when the claims of a
patent are interpreted by the judge instead of the jury. 6 The Court found
that district court judges are better suited to interpret the sometimes
53. Id. The Samara Court also noted that a trade dress or trademark infringement case is
quite different from a patent infringement case because no documents exist that must be
interpreted. The SamaraCourt further noted "[wle have no reason, in our view, to lack confidence
in the ability of a jury, when presented with a trade dress claim, to consider thoughtfully the

evidence presented and to evaluate that evidence under the standards charged by the district
court" Id

54. Id.
55. Samara, 165 F.3d at 124 (emphasis added).
56. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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complex language of patent claims.57 There can be no question that judges,
rather than juries, are better versed on the subject of law. The question that
begs to be asked, however, is what superior qualifications in any particular
art does a district court judge have over a jury to understand complex and
sometimes convoluted claim language? The Marlknan Court noted that
more certainty and uniformity will arise in patent infringement cases when
claims are interpreted by judges instead of juries, but gave no real
explanation behind this reasoning.58 Ittherefore appears that the ultimate
goal in shifting the burden of claim interpretation from a jury to a court is
to make rulings on claim interpretation issues more uniform. Has the U.S.
Supreme Court achieved its goal? The vast number of claim interpretations
that are overturned by the Federal Circuit reveals that the U.S. Supreme
Court's goal in Markman, unfortunately, has not yet been fully achieved.
IV. THE USE OF EXTRrNsIc EVIDENCE WHEN INTERPRETING CLAIMS
When interpreting patent claims, a court may look to many different
sources of evidence. "In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic
evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such
circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence."59 As noted in
the above mentioned cases, it is very common for a court to interpret the
claims of a patent using only intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims, the

57. See id at 390-9 1.
It was just for the sake of such desirable uniformity that Congress created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent
cases, observing that increased uniformity would strengthen the United States
patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial
innovation. Uniformity would, however, be ill served by submitting issues of
document construction to juries.
The Court went on to note that "treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though
not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those
questions not yet subject to interjudicial uniformity under the authority of the single appeals
court." Id. at 391.
58. Id. at 391.
59. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronid, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Pall
Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995) "In construing the claims
we look to the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Extrinsic
evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist in determining the meaning or scope of
technical terms in the claims."
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specifications, and the drawings).' Prosecution history of the patent may
also be considered another source of information when interpreting claims.
Prosecution history may include the actions which occurred during the
pendency of a patent application. For example, communications from the
PTO in the form of Office Actions, and an Applicant's response to an
Office Action may be considered prosecution history. Only in circumstances
where the meaning of the claim cannot be interpreted from the intrinsic
evidence alone should extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, be
used.6 However, intrinsic evidence is the best evidence for interpreting a
claim.62 Extrinsic evidence should only be used to clarify terms in a claim,
not to give the terms a meaning that is contrary to the specifications. In
Karl Koster's Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim Interpretation:
UnderstandingPost-Markman Confusion,"3 Koster notes that "the court
is likely to affirm the Judge's discretion in considering extrinsic evidence as
to controvert a plain interpretation derived from
long as it is not relied upon
'
evidence.""
intrinsic
the
When drafted in a thorough manner, the definition of claim terms should
generally be found within the patent specification. Generally, the patent
holder will benefit from a patent that is drafted in such a way that any claim
term can be defined using intrinsic evidence. More particularly, when the
patent is drafted in a way that a claim term cannot be interpreted using only
60. See Harmone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech Dev. Corp., 904 F.2d 1558,1562 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). "Claim interpretation involves a review of the specification, prosecution history,
claims (including unasserted as well as asserted claims), and, if necessary, other extrinsic
evidence, such as expert testimony."
61. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
62.
Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a
manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the
term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history. "A technical term
used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be
given by persons experienced in the field of the invention, unless it is apparent
from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with
a different meaning." Thus, the specification is always highly relevant to the
claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide
to the meaning of a disputed term.
Vitronics. 90 F.3d at. 1582 (citations omitted).
63. Koster, supra note 12, at 139.
64. Id. at 139. Koster goes on to conclude that "[i]f the claim can be clearly defined using

intrinsic evidence alone, then extrinsic evidence may serve as a touchstone to validate the
interpretation, but relying on extrinsic tojustify an interpretation contradicting intrinsic evidence
will not be sustained." Id. at 139.

MARKMAN EXPOSED: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH MARKMAN HEARINGS

2002)

intrinsic evidence, the patent holder runs the risk ofthird parties interjecting
their interpretations into those claim terms. For example, the patent
challenger can interject a different interpretation through extrinsic evidence
such as expert witness testimony, testimony by the inventor, and definitions
taken from reference manuals. Consequently, the burden rests on the patent
holder to draft the patent in such a way that there is no question as to the
definition of the claim terms.
It cannot be denied, however, that at times a patent may be drafted in
such a way that intrinsic evidence alone is not sufficient for a district court
judge to interpret the claims. As previously mentioned, only at a time when
the intrinsic evidence alone cannot sufficiently be used to interpret the
claims can a district court judge use extrinsic evidence to assist in the
interpretation.65 The issue then arises as to the collection of the extrinsic
evidence.
In an article by Associate Professor Eugene R. Quinn, Jr. discussing the
advantages of using alternative dispute resolution in patent infringement
cases, a respondent to Professor Quinn's survey recognized that the cost
of patent litigation can be quite high." Moreover, in most cases the cost of
arbitrating a patent dispute is usually less than eighty-five percent of the
cost of litigating the same dispute.6 The high costs generally include travel
expenses and expert witness fees. During the discovery stage of the trial,
several expert witnesses are deposed. This testimony is taken in an attempt
to provide the judge with as much extrinsic evidence to interpret the claims
in the event extrinsic evidence becomes necessary. Obviously, the amount
of extrinsic evidence that can be collected during a patent infringement suit
is directly proportional to the amount of time provided by the district court
judge for discovery. Logically, a district court judge should generally end

65.
Extrinsic evidence is anything outside of the patent and its prosecution history,
to include expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises, and
can also be used to help explain scientific principles and to demonstrate the prior
art at the time of the invention. Again, however, extrinsic evidence is to be used
for the court's understanding of the patent, not for the purpose of varying or
contradicting other terms of the claims.
Quigley Corp. v. Gumtech, Inc., 2000 WL 264140 (Pa. ed. 2000) (citing Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1996)).
66. See Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Patent
Litigation:A Survey of PatentLitigators,3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77,95 (1999).

67. Id. The commentators that responded to Associate Professor Quinn's survey further
stated that "[w]ith good case management and an experienced arbitrator, the costs should fall to
less than half of those incurred in litigation." Id. at 95.
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discovery directed to defining claim terms in advance of the Markman
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, it seems that patent litigations
would be less expensive and more time efficient for all parties if the district
court judge were to set the time of the Markman hearing early in the trial
process.
The above discussion regarding the collection of extrinsic evidence
clearly shifts many burdens to the patent holder, and more particularly, to
the patent drafter. The patent drafter must cautiously draft the patent in a
way that all the terms are clear and unambiguous, or risk the danger of a
third party defining claim terms using extrinsic evidence. In a sense, the
drafting of a patent can be equated to the drafting of a contract. Similar to
a contract, it is preferable that all of the terms used in the claims of a patent
be sufficiently defined within the "four comers" of the patent specification
to thereby allow the district court judge to interpret the terms using only
intrinsic evidence.68 The patent holder acts as his own lexicographer, and
therefore, has every opportunity to thoroughly define all of the claimed
terms in the patent specification."9 Patent drafters, therefore, should always
think ahead when drafting a patent in order to avoid the wasteful
expenditure of time, money, and other resources necessary to defend a
patent later. A thoroughly drafted patent will assist the patent holder in
defending the rights granted by the patent.
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE CLAIM INTERPRETATION HOLDINGS

INMARKMAN

As discussed above, claims are interpreted as a question of law, and
therefore, claim construction is subject to de novo review and appellate

revision." Before the decision in Markman, an interpretation of a claim by

68. "[Wihen a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without
looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter
of law and surmmay judgment is appropriate." U.S. Test, Inc. v. NDE Envtl. Corp., 196 F.3d
1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Peterson v. Schimek, 729 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (La. 1999)).
69.
Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a
manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the
term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronid, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
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a jury was left undisturbed since it was a question of fact.' Although the
MarlknanCourt titles claim construction as a "purely legal question,"' the
Court is also careful to note that the "purely legal question" of claim
interpretation does include some findings of"fact-based"" questions. In his
dissenting opinion in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technology, Inc., Circuit Judge
Rader noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Markman II,74 and the Federal
Circuit in MarkmanI," evaded the Seventh Amendment issue by reasoning
that claim construction is a matter of law.76 Judge Rader went on to note
that "the court concerned itself with the jury involvement issue and did not
address appellate review of claim construction.""
In his dissenting opinion in Cybor, Judge Rader further noted that the
plenary standard of review has produced a reversal of almost forty percent
of all claim constructions since Marlonan L."9 Therefore, patent litigators
are more than likely to find themselves balancing the interests of their
clients. For example, patent litigators must decide whether it is worth
dragging their clients through the expense involved with a trial when there
is a forty percent chance that the claim interpretation, on which the entire
trial generally relies, may be overturned by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Another question that patent litigators should ask

71.
[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim
construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions
relating to claim construction. Accordingly, we today disavow any language in
previous opinions of this court that holds, purports to hold, states, or suggests
anything to the contrary.
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
72. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
73. Id.
74. For the purposes of this Article the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments,Inc. may be referred to as Markman !I.
75. For the purposes of this Article, the District Court decision in Markman v.Westview
Instruments, Inc. may be referred to as Markman L
76. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473.
77. See id. Judge Rader further notes that
[t]o get a certain claim interpretation, parties must go past the district court's
Markman 1[52 F.3d 979,34 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995)] proceeding, past
the entirety of discovery, past the entire trial on the merits, past post trial
motions, past briefing and argument to the Federal Circuit - indeed past every
step in the entire course of federal litigation, except Supreme Court review.
Id at 1476 (Rader, dissenting).
78. Id. at 1476.
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themselves is whether there should exist an alternative to the Markman
requirement that claim interpretation be a matter of law for a district court
judge. If the district court judge's interpretation of a patent claim has a
forty percent chance of being overturned by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, then is there another possible alternative to claim
interpretation by a court?
A. EliminationofDe Novo Appellate Review
One possible alternative to the Marlnanholding is not to disturb the
Markman ruling in whole, but to eliminate the de novo appellate review.
Claim interpretation could be left within the discretion of the district court
judge, without allowing a review of the ruling de novo. Under this
alternative, the district court judge's interpretation of the claim would only
be disturbed if it is determined that the district court abused its discretion.
"A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on clearly
erroneous findings of fact, is based on erroneous interpretations ofthe law,
or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful."' " The reasoning behind this
alternative is that although the Markman Court ruled that claim
interpretation is a question of law,' the district court judge's interpretation
of claims is primarily based on an interpretation of the facts presented to the
district court judge during the Markman hearing."' Indeed, it may be
advantageous to the patent system to eliminate de novo appellate review.
This alternative would likely decrease the number of claim interpretations
that are overturned by the Federal Circuit. The appellate court would no
longer review the claim interpretation of the district court judge de novo
and, more particularly, the appellate court would only review the district
court judge's decision based on clearly erroneous findings of fact.
The problem that arises with this alternative, however, is that by
eliminating de novo review, and allowing the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to disturb the district court's ruling only on a clearly
erroneous standard, the claim interpretation hearing becomes a pure issue
of fact. If the claim interpretation hearing is deemed a question of fact,
however, then there is no choice except to submit the question to a jury. In
cases where a court circumvents a jury on pure issues of fact, a court is
likely to find that the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury is

79. Id. at 1460.
80. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
81. "After Markman, a trial judge must determine as questions of law the meaning of patent
claims. The meaning of claim terms is the central issue of patent litigation." Loral Fairchild Corp.
v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76, 79 (1995).
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violated. 2 As explained above, the very reason why the U.S. Supreme
Court in Markman Ildetermined that claim interpretation is a matter of law
was to avoid (or "evade" as put by Judge Rader in Cybor"3 ) the issues of
ajury trial that arise under the Seventh Amendment." This violation of the
Seventh Amendment right makes the elimination of de novo appellate
review an unsound and unfeasible alternative to claim interpretation by a
court.
B. Creation of a Science Court

Another alternative to the current rule under Markman II is the creation
of a science court that includes ajury having members that are technically
inclined, and a judge that has once practiced patent law. This court would
include ajury of people having scientific or technological backgrounds who
could travel around the country trying patent cases in variousjurisdictions.
Interviews with patent litigators and scholars, however, indicate that this
alternative is likely to be frowned upon. In all fields of litigation, both
complex and simple, the burden of informing and educating both ajury and
a court of the issues and facts of a case falls on the attorneys. Even in
complex patent litigation, it becomes the duty of the attorneys to break
down complex technologies for a jury of lay people and a district court
judge, who may be knowledgeable of the law, but may lack the scientific
knowledge necessary to truly understand the technology of the claims in
question. Is it proper to shift the burden of explaining the technology of a
particular patent from an attorney to a jury with a scientific background?
Probably not. Some patent litigators and members of the judiciary agree
that to remove the burden of explaining the technology associated with the
patent at issue from the hands of the attorney is not only improper, but also
dangerous."' Where is the sense in requiring attorneys to make arguments,
when a court is relying on the scientific backgrounds of those persons on
the professional jury to make a judgement? There exists no realistic
justification for allowing this situation to occur. In an arrangement such as
this, a jury stacked with scientific experts is likely to interpret the claims
based on their own knowledge, rather than on the information disclosed in
the patent or the arguments made by the attorneys.

82. Markman, 517 U.S. 370.
83. See supratext accompanying note 62.
84. See Judge Rader's dissenting opinion in Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473.
85. Information gathered from judges and patent litigators during interviews while
conducting research for this Article.
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Another problem with this alternative is the practicality of empaneling
ajury with the requisite scientific or technological background in a day and
age when patents are granted in such broad ranges of technology. Is there
any advantage to a specialized patent jury comprised of mechanical and
electrical engineers, for example, when the patent at issue is a biotechnical
patent or a method of doing business patent? This would be a patent
infringement case better suited for biotechnologists or business persons,
respectively. Furthermore, technologies greatly vary within broad areas. For
example, within the field of civil engineering there are disciplines of steel
bridge and structure design, roadway design, soil mechanics, water
resource management, land erosion, hydrology, and foundation design,just
to name a few. It could be quite difficult to find persons suited to sit on the
science court that, regardless of their knowledge in a broad technological
area, could competently make decisions in such specialized fields.
It is also not realistically possible to empanel a different scientific or
technological jury based on the technology of the patent in question for
every patent case that goes to trial. The courts have enough problems in
trying to obtain sufficient members of the local community to perform their
civic duty by participating injury duty. It would place an undue burden on
the courts to attempt to empanel juries with people that are educated or
experienced in particular fields of technology or science. Empaneling these
specialized juries as a mechanism to decrease the responsibility currently
shouldered by the attorneys such as explaining the true issues of the patent
infringement suit and the details of the patent would be an undue hardship
on the courts. Therefore, it is clear that the formation of the science court
is not a feasible alternative, and attorneys must still shoulder the burden of
thoroughly explaining the technology of certain patents to the jury and
court.

Still another problem with this alternative is one of human nature.
Although the persons involved with the science court would all be generally
knowledgeable with respect to the particular technologies involved with the
patent at issue, they will most likely have varying opinions. This is quite
evident when observing or participating in patent litigation where expert
witnesses are used. For example, the plaintiff in a particular case will likely
present an expert witness that is qualified in a particular field to testify in a
manner that is beneficial to the plaintiff. Similarly, the defendant in the same
case will likely present another expert that is just as qualified as the
plaintiff's expert, but who will provide an opinion that is contrary to the
expert witness presented by the plaintiff. In such situations, the
determinative factor is generally the credibility of each witness. This is
usually judged by the character and qualifications of each expert, often
based on education and years of practice in the field. Now, imagine that the
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jury box is filled with persons that rise to the level of expert witnesses!"
Clearly, every member of the jury will not be an expert on the particular
technology presented, but there is a chance that the jury members will have
varying opinions that fall on either side of the spectrum. This, however, is
not a unique problem because in any jury, regardless of whether the jury is
assembled in a science court or not, jurors may have varying opinions. A
problem may arise, however, when the jurors' opinions are clearly contrary
to the evidence presented during the trial and those jurors act on their
contrary opinions. For example, the jurors of the science court may have
opinions that vary greatly from those of the experts that are presented at
trial. These experts in the science court may make decisions based on their
own knowledge, instead of based on the evidence presented at trial.
C. ProfessionalJuries
Still another alternative to the current Marknan II requirement of
having a judge construe claims as a matter of law, is the use of a
professional jury that is empaneled solely for the purpose of interpreting
claims. 8 The professional jury can, for example, include persons who are
well versed in the intricacies of patent law, or, like those persons sitting on
the science court, have strong technological backgrounds. 8 One advantage
of this alternative is directly linked to one of the previously mentioned
alternatives: the elimination of the de novo appellate review. 9 An
advantage of empaneling a professional jury is the elimination of questions
regarding the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial." Although the
decision in MarknanII put this issue to rest by holding that the Seventh

86. See dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Rader in Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 noting
"[mioreover, by assigning claim interpretation to the judge, Markman H has already corrected the
major source of the problem with experts, namely their ability to influence lay jurors with the
strength of their resumes rather than the strength of their reasoning."
87. See Davin M. Stockwell, A Jury of One's (TechnicallyCompetent)Peers?,21 WHITnER
L. REv. 645 (2000). Although Mr. Stockwell's article is very persuasive as to the many advantages
of empaneling professional juries in patent litigation matters, he does point out one of the major
problems that will likely stand in the way of empaneling a professional jury: "[tjhe final obstacle
regarding the implementation of a system of qualified jurors in patent litigation involves actually
persuading individuals who possess 'training in scientific and technical matters' to participate."
Id. at 693. For further discussion on professional juries, see Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From
Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for Professional Juries in Complex Civil
Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &APP. ADvOC. 1 (1998).
88. The disadvantages of empaneling a jury made up of only persons having strong
technological backgrounds has been previously discussed above. See infra Part V.B.
89. See infra Part V.A. (for discussion on elimination of de novo appellate review).
90. See infra Part IIl (detailed discussion of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury).
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Amendment right to a trial by jury is not infringed by allowing a district
court judge to interpret patent claims, it is quite evident that the argument
will no longer be made.9
There are some pitfalls, however- that are encountered with this
alternative. For example, the economic feasibility of a professional jury
must be studied. Empaneling a professional jury depends largely on the
interest and cooperation of persons in the community who are technically
inclined. Although the argument can always be made that jury duty is a
civic duty that everyone should fulfill when called, it cannot be ignored that
technically inclined persons, such as engineers, scientists, doctors,
economists, computer specialists, etc., are under time constraints such as
project deadlines, and are generally well compensated. As noted in
Stockwell's A Jury of One's (Technically Competent) Peers?, one
alternative is to monetarily entice people with technical knowledge to sit on
the jury.92 Although this appears to be a solution to one of the problems
associated with finding technically inclined persons to sit on professional
juries, it again raises the issue of economic feasibility. Stockwell does not
set forth a proposal as to who would pay the competitive wages to the
members of the professional jury. Is this a cost that will be passed on to the
taxpayers or to the parties in the patent litigation? If it is a cost that is to be
passed on to the parties in the patent litigation, then the proverbial can of
worms related to the high costs of patent litigation is again opened. 93 The
cost of the professional jury only adds to the already high cost of patent
litigation. The high costs of patent litigation may make it difficult, and
sometimes impossible, for small or individual inventors to enforce their

patents, as they are not likely to be as well funded as large corporations.
How is this system supposed to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts?
Another problem is that generally we only ask juries to make a simple
determination of guilt and/or liability, for example. In this case we would
be asking ajury to interpret and determine the meaning of various terms
found in the claims of a patent. Would the foreman be responsible for
writing the opinion on behalf of the jury? Would somejurors be allowed to
file dissenting opinions? In his article, Stockwell recommends that since the
PTO has established separate admission requirements like the registration
examination, and internal non-jury tribunals like the Board of Patent

91. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377(1996).
92. "Similarly, under the professional jury system, [a] qualified candidate will be more
likely to volunteer for service if the government offers a competitive wage." Stockwell, supranote

87, at 693.
93. See infra Part 11.
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Appeals and Interferences (Board), then it should also establish a separate
that would not violate the Seventh Amendment right to a trial
jury system
9
by jury '
This proposition, however, seems a bit out of place with respect to the
comparisons made to the PTO's separate admission requirements and nonjury tribunals. For example, if an application for a patent is rejected by the
Board, then an inventor may appeal that decision to the Federal Circuit.95
Therefore, the non-jury tribunal referred to by Stockwell is one that does
not necessarily act in cooperation with a court, but rather, acts alone. The
decisions of the Board, for example, are not final because they can be
appealed to the Federal Circuit.9 However, the creation of a separate jury
system by the PTO would have to be one that would work alongside the
courts to make determinations of claim construction and infringement. One
problem with this alternative is the location of the PTO with respect to the
various jurisdictions. Would the professional jury formed by the PTO travel
to the separate jurisdictions or would all patent litigation take place at the
PTO? Furthermore, the issue of economics once again rears its ugly head.
Who would be responsible for the cost associated with the professional
jury? If patent litigation is to take place at the PTO, then the parties to the
patent litigation would have to plan for added travel expenses when
litigatinga patent case.
D. The Best Alternative
For now, the best alternative for interpreting claims is to leave it in the
hands of the judge. Stockwell's article illustrates how a professional jury
could be utilized to take the responsibility of construing patent claims from
the district court judge and put it back into the hands of the jury.97
Although Stockwell provided a detailed description of the steps involved
in empanelinga professional jury, 9 ' the advantages of the professional jury
must still be balanced against the various disadvantages and costs discussed
above such as cost effectiveness and efficiency. The cost effectiveness is
especially important because rising costs are putting the patent system more
and more out of the reach of the small individual inventors with limited
resources.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 683.
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMiNG PRoCEDURES sec.

Id.
Stockwell, supra note 87, at 646.
Id. at 661.
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VI. TIMING OF MARKMAN HEARINGS

Since the U.S. Supreme Court did not provide any specific timing for
holding Markman hearings, it appears that they can be held at several
different stages during a patent litigation. For example, a judge can
construe the claims before discovery begins, during discovery, at the end
of discovery, or just before jury instructions at trial. This section will
evaluate the pros and cons of the various times when the Marlkmanhearings
may be held. This section will also discuss the Northern District of
California Patent Local Rules, which provide a time line for patent
litigation. Lastly, this section will discuss the public policy reasons why
Markman hearings should take place earlier instead of later.
A. Possible Times During Patent Litigation to Hold Markman Hearings
As previously explained, the Markman hearing that must take place for
the proper interpretation of the claims in a patent infringement suit may be
performed at several different times during a patent infringement case."
The possible times for holding the claim interpretation hearing that will now
be discussed include pre-discovery, during discovery, at the end of
discovery but-before trial, and before the judge gives jury instructions at
trial.
The first possible time, pre-discovery, is not feasible. In order to present
a sufficient argument to a court so that a judge may properly interpret the
claims, both parties must perform some detailed investigation. When having
the Marlknan hearing during discovery, the parties should be able to
examine and prepare for the arguments that will be made on both sides.
This certainly will make for a better utilization of a court's valuable time
and can be effectively performed during discovery. The question that arises,
however, is the amount of time that should be set for discovery. Should the
time vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction? Should it depend on the
complexity of the technology, or should it simply be the same for all patent
litigation? Thus, the next question that arises is the timing of the Marlanan
hearing in relation to discovery.
This leads to the next possible time to hold the Markman hearing: at the
conclusion of discovery. As discussed in Section IV, some cases may
require a district courtjudge to use extrinsic evidence to interpret claims.'1°
99. See infra Part VI.
100. As previously noted above, and as discussed in Koster's article on the use of extrinsic
evidence in construing a patent, extrinsic evidence should only be used when intrinsic evidence
is not sufficient to allow the district court judge to interpret the claims. See supra text
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Of course, this extrinsic evidence is generally collected during discovery.
One alternative, however, is to conduct a claim interpretation hearing early
in the discovery process, during which time the district court judge can
determine whether or not extrinsic evidence will be necessary to construe
the claims of the patent at issue. For example, both parties can make
presentations to the judge as to why or why not extrinsic evidence should
be considered, or even presented, during the Markman hearing. The district
court judge may then be in a better position to determine a proper length
of time for discovery. With respect to holding the claim interpretation
hearing before trial, Circuit Judge Rader in LoralFairchildCorp.v. Victor

Company of Japan (Sitting in Designation) noted:
With most aspects of trial hinging on this determination
now "strictly a question of law for the court" a conscientious
court will generally endeavor to make this ruling before trial.
A trial court faced with conflicting views of technical terms
may prudently enlist the aid of qualified experts to determine
the meaning of the claim terms. As in this case, this
proceeding to assist the court in ascertaining the law is likely
to occur after discovery in which the parties have exchanged
information relevant to their understanding of the claims."
-

Therefore, Circuit Judge Rader suggested that not only should the
Markman hearing take place before trial, but since extrinsic evidence may
be used by the district court judge to interpret the claims, the hearing
should take place after discovery. °2 Circuit Judge Rader goes on to note
that after discovery, the parties will have exchanged information relevant
to their understanding of the claims.'0 3 This likely makes the claim
interpretation process much more efficient and economic as well as easier
for the district court judge construing the claim.
The last option that will be discussed is holding the Markman hearing
after both parties have presented their arguments, but before the district
court judge gives the jury instructions. As noted by Circuit Judge Rader in
Loral FairchildCorp., most aspects of the patent litigation will hinge upon

accompanying note 69. Ifthe district court judge uses extrinsic evidence to construe the claims in
a way that is contradictory to an interpretation found in the intrinsic evidence, that interpretation
will likely be overruled on appeal.
101. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Markman 1, 52 F.3d 979, 34 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
102. Id. at 79.
103. Id.
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the district courtjudge's Marlnanruling."°4 In Cybor, Circuit Judge Rader
further noted in his dissent, that "the advantage of Markman hearings
[Markinan 1] is that it provides early certainty of the claim terms and
therefore, it prompts early settlement."' °5 In discussing the ruling of
Marlknan 1,Circuit Judge Rader states that:
[o]nce the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can predict
with some reliability the likelihood of a favorable judgment, factor
in the economics of the infringement, and arrive at a settlement to
save the costs of litigation. Markman I promised to provide this
benefit early in the trial court process. To provide fairness under the
Markman Iregime, trial judges would provide claim interpretations
before the expense of trial."°
By holding the claim interpretation hearing after the parties have
presented their cases, but before the district court judge provides jury
instructions, the parties are prevented from knowing the boundaries of the
patent until the end of the case. A patent infringement case can be
somewhat analogized to a dispute over real property. Disputes over real
property rely heavily on the boundaries of the property in question.
Similarly, disputes in patent litigation revolve around the boundaries of
protection provided by the patent grant. It would be difficult for the parties
to formulate proper infringement or invalidity arguments regarding the
patent at issue when there has not yet been a ruling as to the boundaries of
protection provided by the patent grant. It would be even more difficult for
the jury to follow the arguments made by both parties regarding
infringement and invalidity when they too do not know the boundaries of
protection provided by the patent grant.
B. Northern Districtof CaliforniaPatentLocal Rules
One model for the timing of patent infringement has recently been set
by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. As
discussed in detail below, the Northern District of California Patent Local
Rules include a time frame for the steps involved in patent litigation. The
effective date of the rules are January 1, 2001. The following discussion

104. Id
105.. See Circuit Judge Rader's dissenting opinion in Cybor, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc.,
138 F.3d at 1475 (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 1475.
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will focus on a step by step analysis of the timing of patent litigation in a
hypothetical case beginning on January 1, 2001.
Day one of the patent litigation, or January 1, 2001, in this hypothetical
case, will include an Initial Case Management Conference, in which the
parties confer regarding various topics. According to court rules, the topics
will include: (1) proposed modifications ofdeadlines provided by the patent
local rules; (2) whether live testimony will be presented in the Markinan
hearing; (3) the need for limits on discovery; (4) the order of presentation
at the Markman hearing; and (5) the scheduling of the Markman hearing.1 7
It is important to note that these courts require the parties to meet and
discuss the intricacies of the Markman hearing and what steps will be taken
before reaching the Markman hearing.'08 For example, the above mentioned
topics include whether or not live testimony will be needed during the
Markman hearing and the need for limits on discovery. This is
advantageous in that it allows the parties to anticipate and agree on matters
such as whether or not the parties are in for a lengthy and costly patent
litigation. This section also provides for additional case management
conferences if the need for them should arise.'1 9
Within ten days of the Initial Case Management Conference, or on
January 11, 2001, in this hypothetical case, "a party claiming patent
infringement must serve on all parties a 'Disclosure ofAsserted Claims and
Preliminary Infringement Contentions.""' 0 The "Disclosure of Asserted
Claims" and the "Preliminary Infringement Contentions" shall contain a
detailed description of the claims and the allegedly infringing apparatus,
product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality."' This rule
goes into great detail as to document production, and more particularly, as
to the specific documents that must be provided by the party claiming
infringement." 2
"Not later than 45 days after service upon it of the 'Disclosure of
Asserted Claims and Preliminary Infringement Contentions,' each party
opposing a claim of patent infringement, shall serve on all parties its
'Preliminary Invalidity Contentions.""' 3 In the present hypothetical case,
therefore, the "Preliminary Invalidity Contentions" will be provided by
February 24, 2001. This rule requires the parties to provide a list of the

107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent

L. R. 2-1(a).
L. R. 2-1(a-b).
L. R. 2-1(b).
L. R. 3-1.
L. R. 3-1.

112. Patent L. R. 3-1.
113. Patent L. R. 3-3.
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prior art which allegedly anticipates each asserted claim or renders it
obvious and a chart showing where in the prior art each asserted claim can
be found." 4 Therefore, within 45 days of the commencement of the patent
litigation in the Northern District of California, all of the parties are likely
to be aware of the infringement and invalidity contentions on both sides.
Once again, this quickly and efficiently provides all parties with a forward
view of the patent litigation.
"Not later than 10 days after service of the 'Preliminary Invalidity
Contentions' pursuant to Patent L. R. 3-3, each party shall simultaneously
exchange a list of claim terms, phrases, or clauses which that party contends
should be construed by the Court.'" In the present hypothetical case,
therefore, the simultaneous exchange of the claim terms that should be
construed by the judge will be provided no later than March 6, 2001. This
rule is advantageous because it quickly removes any ambiguity as to which
terms a court is to construe. Additionally, this will likely decrease the costs
associated with discovery by focusing both parties on the issues at hand
rather than having the parties wasting valuable time and resources guessing
which terms are going to be at issue.
Within twenty days after the exchange of the "Proposed Terms and
Claim Elements for Construction," or March 26, 2001, according to the
hypothetical case, the Northern District of California Patent Local Rules
require all parties to simultaneously exchange preliminary proposed
construction of each claim term which the parties collectively have
identified for claim construction purposes." 6 The rule provides that the
parties should simultaneously provide a "preliminary identification of
extrinsic evidence, including without limitation, dictionary definitions,
citations to learned treatises and prior art, and testimony of percipient and
expert witnesses they contend support their respective claim
constructions."" 7 This rule limits the time available for expert witness
depositions and research to only sixty-five days from the initial case
management conference."' This can be a double-edged sword, however,
because although it provides for a time efficient process, the gathering of
this information in such a short period of time could be costly because it
may necessitate a team of attorneys in order to get it done. Patent litigation
is not unique to the region where the inventor is located, but can be
nationwide, especially if the allegedly infringing invention is something that
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is sold or used nationwide. In such a case, gathering the required
information in such a short time is a costly process. Furthermore, expert
witnesses might also be located across the nation. The sixty-five day limit
can work against the parties as it may dangerously limit the time available
for gathering extrinsic evidence that may be necessary for the claim
interpretation hearing. It can be advantageous to the patent holder whose
patent is clearly drafted because the limited time will greatly decrease the
cost of discovery, especially if the patent can stand on its own by not
requiring any extrinsic evidence.
"Not later than 60 days after service of the 'Preliminary Invalidity
Contentions,' the parties shall complete and file a Joint Claim Construction
and Prehearing Statement."'s Accordingly, in the present hypothetical case,
the parties would therefore file the "Joint Claim Construction" and
"Prehearing Statement" by April 25, 2001. The patent local rules note that
the "Joint Claim Construction" should include: (1) a construction of the
terms upon which both parties agree; (2) each parties proposed
construction of claim terms in dispute; (3) anticipated length of time of the
Marlkan hearing; (4) whether either of the parties intend to call any
witnesses at the Markman hearing; and (5) a list of issues that should be
heard by the judge at a prehearing conference prior to the Marlnan
hearing. 0 Again, this is efficient in that it quickly eliminates many issues
that a court would normally have to decide. Under the Northern District of
California Patent Local Rules, the terms that the district court judge will
have to construe are clearly set forth, thereby eliminating any speculation
that may occur during the Markman hearing (which of course makes for a
longer hearing).''

The Northern District of California rules then instruct the parties to
complete all discovery relating to claim construction within thirty days of
the filing of the "Joint Claim Construction" and the "Prehearing
Statement."' 22 In the present hypothetical case, therefore, discovery would
be closed by May 25, 2001. Once again, this becomes a double-edged
sword. Under the Northern District of California's rules, discovery is closed
just 145 days after the initial case management conference takes place.
While this is an efficient process, complex patent litigation such as that in
which more than one patent is at issue, the question must be asked whether
or not 145 days is enough time to collect the information necessary to
litigate the patents. Conversely, this is quite advantageous in the case of less
119. Patent L. R. 4-3.
120. Patent L. R. 4-3(a-e).
121. .Patent L. R. 4-3 (a-e).
122. Patent L. R. 4-4.
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complex patent litigation where only one patent is at issue. For example,
the costs of discovery will likely decrease because both parties will have to
find ways to maximize time efficiency because of the time constraints. This
may mean foregoing a second expert witness opinion, or only relying on
two treatises rather than three.
Within forty-five days after the "Joint Claim Construction" and
"Prehearing Statements" are filed, the party claiming infringement is
required to file an opening brief along with any evidence supporting its
claim construction.I2 3 Within two weeks of filing the brief, the opposing
party is required to file a responsive brief along with any supporting
evidence. 4 Within one week after service of the responsive brief filed by
the opposing party, the party claiming infringement is required to file a
reply brief."2 5 Accordingly, the due dates of the opening brief, the opposing
party's responsive brief, and the reply brief in the present hypothetical case
are June 9, 2001, June 23, 2001, and June 30, 2001, respectively. The
Markman hearing will be held two weeks following the submission of the
reply brief, subject to court availability.' 2 ' Therefore, under the hypothetical
case as presented throughout this discussion, the Marlknan hearing would
take place by July 14, 2001, depending on court availability.
The Northern District of California, Patent Local Rules have truly
streamlined patent litigation. Within 195 days from the initial Case
Management Conference, the Marlknan hearing is completed. The
Northern District ofCalifornia has made this possible by shifting the burden
of eliminating issues intothe hands of the parties. For example, the parties
are required to present the construction of claim terms that are agreed upon
and a determination of the claim terms that the parties cannot agree upon.
The district court judge can therefore easily combine the agreed upon
interpretation of the claims submitted by the parties (if the district court
judge agrees with the interpretation of those claim terms) with the
interpretation of the claim terms in dispute in order to provide a speedy
interpretation of the claims prior to the commencement of the trial phase of
the litigation. The speed of this process in completing the Markman hearing
truly gives the parties a good understanding of their case, where they stand,
and the road ahead. In most cases, the interpretation of the claims will set
forth the previously unknown boundaries of the patent at issue. With the
boundaries clearly defined, the parties may be more willing to settle the
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case, 27rather than subject themselves to the extra costs associated with
trial.
C. Hold Claim InterpretationHearingsEarly
to Provide More Certainty
As presented above and as adopted by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, the best possible time to hold Markman
hearings is before trial and after a limited discovery period. A limited
discovery period should last between five to six months. Although five to
six months may seem to be a shortened period of time in relation to some
of the year long discovery proceedings that currently exist in patent
infringement cases throughout the various jurisdictions, it should be enough
time to gather sufficient evidence in support of a particular construction of
the claims. A five to six month limit on discovery should also effectively
limit parties from stacking the testimony of numerous experts with similar
qualifications who will counter the opposing experts.
One major reason for limiting discovery time and providing a fast claim
interpretation hearing is to open the door to the patent litigation process to
the small inventor. For example, the patent holder that is not a multi-million
dollar company with an unlimited source of funds to pay legal fees. This is
not to say that the door to the courts is closed to the small inventor, but
rather, they are tough to access. Suppose an individual invents a device and
eventually, after taking out small business loans, obtains a patent on the
device. After obtaining the patent, suppose this individual approaches a
large corporation with the patent grant and offers to license the invention
to the large corporation. The large corporation is quite interested in the
device, but decides to infringe the patent grant instead of paying for the
license. The large corporation does this partly because they are aware that
it will be very difficult and costly for the individual to enforce the patent
against the large corporation. The corporation has a large legal department
that can mount a defense to an infringement action, countersue for patent
invalidity, or simply drag the case out until the individual can no longer
fund the case, thereby forcing small inventors to either settle or drop the
case. What is the individual to do?
Unless supported by a wealthy investor believing in the patent, a small
individual inventor, outside the Northern District of California, is not in the
financial position to file a patent infringement suit to enforce the rights
provided by the patent grant. Under the Northern District of California

127. See Circuit Judge Rader's dissenting opinion in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., noting
that Markmnan hearings provide early certainty which promotes settlement.
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Patent Local Rules, however, the schedule of the patent litigation is known
and a court can advantageously provide an early claim interpretation ruling
using only a limited amount of time for discovery. A limited discovery
period favors an individual inventor by decreasing the cost of patent
litigation. The other side of this argument, however, is that the limited
discovery period may prompt the parties to greatly increase the use of legal
resources. For example, parties may hire numerous attorneys to take many
depositions in the interest of conserving time, or may hire many paralegals
to conduct research rather than just one paralegal. The increase in legal
resources greatly increases the cost of patent litigation. With good planning
and case management, however, the individual inventor should find the
courts more accessible when a court limits discovery and holds the claim
interpretation hearing before trial. Furthermore, and as noted by Circuit
Judge Rader in Cybor,"' an early claim interpretation by a court provides
certainty of the claim terms and prompts early settlement, thereby
enhancing court efficiency."2 9 Therefore, the best time for a district court
judge to hold a claim interpretation hearing is early in the patent litigation
process.
VII. CONCLUSION

Over time, patent litigation has become costly, and accordingly, has
sometimes made access to the courts quite difficult for individual inventors
who do not have a great deal of the financial resources necessary to enforce
the rights provided for by their patent grant. The introduction of Markman
hearings, although necessary, somewhat increased the cost of patent
litigation. Although the decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments,Inc.
finally put to rest the question of whether claim interpretation is a question
of fact for a jury to decide or a question of law for a judge to decide, the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision that a district court judge should interpret
claims in patent litigation created many new questions. On the question of
whether a patentee's Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial is violated by
allowing a judge to construe patent claims the Court concluded it is not.
The Court held that because the issue of infringement is still decided by a
jury, the patentee's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury is not
violated. 3°

128. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d at 1475.
129. Id.
130. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996).
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One issue that the MarknanCourt left unanswered concerns the timing
of the claim interpretation hearing. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision
instructed the district court judge to construe patent claims, "' but gave
judges no guidelines as to when during patent litigation to do so. Therefore,
district court judges may interpret patent claims anytime during patent
litigation. It would appear, however, that the most effective time to hold the
claim interpretation hearing is before trial and after a limited discovery
period. Perhaps best set forth in the Northern District of California Patent
Local Rules, the claim interpretation hearing should be held shortly after the
close of a four to six month discovery period to greatly reduce the high
costs associated with patent litigation. This thereby provides greater access
to the courts for individual patentees. Furthermore, by providing early
certainty of the claim terms, especially when the interpretation of the claim
language is dispositive of an issue of infringement or invalidity, early
settlement can sometimes be prompted, and the efficiency of the courts can
be maximized.

131. 1d. at372.

